By Mike Forster, 2018 to 2026
This presentation shows the significant advantages of a viaduct for Palo Alto Caltrain (and High-Speed Rail) grade separations. Versions of this have been provided to the Palo Alto City Council from 2018 through 2026.
By Mike Forster, 2018 to 2026
This presentation shows the significant advantages of a viaduct for Palo Alto Caltrain (and High-Speed Rail) grade separations. Versions of this have been provided to the Palo Alto City Council from 2018 through 2026.
Dear Mike,
I appreciate the effort you’ve made to engage on Palo Alto’s rail problem, but your analysis overlooks the real trade-offs of the viaduct approach you’re advocating.
First, I want to acknowledge the many residents and volunteers in XCAP and the current Rail Committee leadership who have devoted enormous time and energy to this issue. Their civic commitment deserves respect. But the challenge we are facing is far larger than what volunteer committees—or a single city government—can realistically solve. A multi-billion-dollar regional rail corridor requires specialized engineering expertise, regional coordination, and a level of funding and project management that Palo Alto simply does not have on its own.
A viaduct would permanently damage the neighborhoods along the rail corridor. Homes along Alma Street and Park Boulevard would lose privacy and face elevated noise, while a massive elevated structure would run the length of the city. That is not a small aesthetic issue—it fundamentally reshapes neighborhoods and property values for generations. Your analysis does not meaningfully address those impacts, nor the years of construction disruption required to build such a structure.
Just as concerning is the city’s track record managing complex capital projects. The Mitchell Park Library began with a $24.4 million construction contract but ultimately cost about $46 million—nearly double—and opened roughly 2½ years late. The new Public Safety Building is complete, but the City and its contractor are currently locked in a legal dispute over roughly $20 million in change orders on a $120 million project—about 17% of the total budget. Disputes of that scale typically reflect planning gaps and scope problems. Grade separation projects are far more complex than either of these examples.
The rail corridor involves multiple agencies and jurisdictions—Caltrain, Union Pacific, the California Public Utilities Commission, and neighboring cities such as Menlo Park and Mountain View. Palo Alto does not control most of those actors. Yet the current process effectively asks one city to plan and engineer infrastructure that could easily exceed $1 billion in total cost along the corridor.
Meanwhile, Caltrain itself has struggled to execute projects efficiently. The system spent about $2.4 billion on electrification, yet still had basic safety gaps such as unfinished fencing along parts of the corridor. That does not inspire confidence in the current governance structure.
The risk is clear: a piecemeal, city-by-city process will likely produce the cheapest, most disruptive solution—an elevated structure that permanently divides communities. Once built, it cannot be undone.
Before committing Palo Alto to that outcome, we should seriously reconsider alternatives such as trenching or tunneling, and we should insist on the level of engineering expertise and regional coordination that projects of this magnitude require.
A decision that will shape Palo Alto for the next 100 years deserves that level of rigor.
Would love to hear your thoughts.
Sincerely,
John M.